against the claim that, for example, "Tom will get angry if you criticize him" makes a conditional assertion.
Suppose I utter (1), and my hearer takes me to have made a conditional assertion of the consequent, which will have the force of an assertion of the consequent if she presses the button. Provided that she takes me to be sincere, she takes me to have expressed a belief in the consequent on the supposition that she presses the button; and provided that she takes me to be reliable, she thinks that if she presses the button, the consequent I conditionally asserted is likely to be true. That is, she acquires a belief in the consequent on the supposition that she presses the button. Not wanting an explosion, she doesn't press the button. A piece of successful linguistic communication took place-I expressed a conditional belief, I conditionally committed myself to the consequent-despite my utterance being "nonassertive" in Belnap's sense. If this is satisfying in the case of simple conditional assertions, we might also be able to explain why, being told "Some boy in the class will attack you with a knife if you criticize him today", and interpreting that as a conditional assertion, I might well refrain from criticizing any boy.
Belnap's account makes (9) true, false or nonassertive in just the same circumstances as, and hence equivalent to (2) If I criticize at least one boy in the class, then at least one of the boys whom I criticize will get angry (see Kölbel 2000 p. 106, and Belnap 1970 p. 8) . (9) and (2) are not equivalent, however. Suppose there is one boy, Tom, who invariably gets angry when criticized, while the other boys invariably don't. Someone, X, knowing these facts, asserts a second-person version of (9). I criticize some boys, none of whom gets angry, and don't criticize Tom. 1 (2) has been refuted. (9) has not. X need not admit error in his assertion of (9). A sufficient ground for believing (9) is the belief that Tom will be angry if criticized (given that Tom is a boy in the class). Hence (9) cannot be refuted by others' lack of anger when criticized. X might have said beforehand: "There is a boy in the class who will get angry if she criticizes him today, namely Tom. None of the others get angry when criticized. She probably won't criticize Tom. It's quite likely that, if she criticizes some boys, none of the boys she criticizes will get angry". X thus expresses belief in (9) and doubt about (2). What he said was quite coherent. Hence (9) and (2) are not equivalent.
(9) is, to use a theoretically neutral term, the opposite of (3) No boy in the class will get angry if I criticize him.
To accept one is to reject the other. The more confident you are in one, the less confident in the other. If we had an account of (3), we should be able to understand (9) in terms of it. Kölbel makes a proposal about (3): that we interpret it, using restricted quantification, as (*) "No boy whom I criticize will get angry" (2000, p. 102). I am in favour of restricted, or binary, quantification as a means of giving a uniform treatment of the quantifiers in statements of the form: all/most/ many/few/some/no Fs are G. It also has the advantage of making it unnecessary to discern a conditional in the logical form of "all Fs are G". But, as we have already seen, (*) is not equivalent to (3). The truth of (*) does not establish (3) and refute (9). X disbelieves (3) but thinks (*) is quite likely to be true.
A change to Belnap's proposal is more promising. Suppose I had criticized all the boys, and none had become angry. Then X's remark would have been refuted. Conversely, if at least one had become angry, X would have been vindicated. Thus, (9) is perhaps equivalent to (4) If I criticize all the boys in the class, at least one boy will get angry. We can "test" a conditional whose antecedent we can bring about: bring about the antecedent, and check whether or not the consequent is true. To believe the conditional is to believe that if it is tested, the result will be positive. An analogous test of (9), it seems, would be to criticize boy after boy until one gets angry. If I get through them all and none has got angry, (9) has been refuted. Belief in (9) thus seems to be equivalent to belief in (4).
Another example: we enter a lecture room and want to turn on the blackboard light. We face an array of switches. "There is a switch which will turn on the blackboard light if you press it", I'm told. I press switch after switch until I get the desired effect. If I press them all without the desired effect, the remark was wrong.
This paraphrase of (9) does seem to work over a range of cases, and illuminates some. In general, an existentially quantified statement can be highly probable even when each of its instances is improbable. Tickets numbered 10 to 100 are in a lottery. It's very likely that some two-digit number will win; but any particular two-digit number has a low chance of winning. I think the same phenomenon arises for statements of the form of (9). I can toss up to ten coins and as soon as one lands heads I win a prize. Naturally I have to pay for the privilege, but the price is reasonable, given the odds: it's very likely that there is a coin which will land heads if I toss it; for it's very likely that, if I toss them all, I'll get at least one head. Misfortune has left us penniless in the middle of the city, and desperately in need of a little cash. "Someone will give you the money if you ask them", I say. I need not think that there is some truly generous person out there with a strong disposition to give. I may think that many transient variables influence whether a person gives money in such a circumstance; for any one person, the chance is quite low that they will give. But there are a lot of people out there: if you ask enough people, someone will give you the money. Call these "safety-in-numbers" cases.
(4) and (9) are not equivalent in all cases, however. "If you stand on your toes, you'll see better", I say to Tom in a crowd watching a procession. Hence I believe (5) Someone in the crowd will see better if they stand on their toes. But I don't believe (6) If everyone in the crowd stands on their toes, someone will see better. True, my remark to Tom and its existential generalization, (5), are refuted if everyone stands on their toes and no one sees better. Still, Tom has a pretty good chance of seeing better if he stands on his toes, hence (5) has a good chance of being vindicated, whereas (6) has no chance at all (making simplifying assumptions about the size of feet, and assuming that those in the front row see perfectly anyway).
Statements of the forms of (9) and (4) are equivalent, I think, when the instances of (9) are judged to be independent: when the probability that one F is G if it is H is not affected by what happens to other Fs (to put it roughly). Another case of non-independence which cannot be treated along the lines of (4) are what we might call "one-off" cases: there is a boy in the class who will be angry if I criticize him and him alone tomorrow; there's a boy who will be upset if he gets a lower mark than any other boy tomorrow. There's a code number such that if I enter it first, I'll gain access to the building; but I'm only allowed one go; if I'm wrong the first time, access is denied.
Unlike safety-in-numbers cases, one-off cases are justifiably believed, typically, on the ground that some F has a dispositional property which produces a high chance of G on H: some boy (you may not know which) is strongly disposed to anger when criticized. (You may believe this because this disposition is quite common in boys, it's a big class, every class you've ever known has included at least one such boy.) Belief that some F has a suitable dispositional property is another sufficient condition for accepting something of the form (9).
I have focused on examples like Kölbel's of conditionals whose antecedent concerns an action. There are of course other examples. Suppose I know that there's a boy in the class (I may not know which) who is presently in either France or Spain (I don't know which). So there's a boy who is in France if he isn't in Spain. (And if no boy is in Spain, some boy is in France.) A sufficient condition for believing something of the form "Some F is G if it is not H" is believing that some F is either H or G, while not having any firm belief about whether such an F is H or whether it is G; so a sufficient condition for believing "Some F is G if it is H " is believing some F is either not-H or G, while having no firm belief about which disjunct holds.
I have assembled some sufficient conditions for accepting or asserting something of the form (9), but have not found a satisfactory general analysis. J. L. Mackie (1973, p. 97 ) had a proposal for general conditionals which, applied to (3) "No boy in the class will get angry if you criticize him", would construe it thus:
(7) Take a boy in the class at random; suppose that you criticize him; then he will not get angry. That is, to accept (3) is to be prepared to assert, of an arbitrarily selected boy, that he will not get angry, on the supposition that I criticize him. Judgements about (3) and (7) coincide in the case of acceptance with certainty, but not in other cases. I might be very close to certain that an arbitrarily selected boy will not get angry on the supposition that he is criticized, yet reject (3): there is a very large number of boys in the class, one and only one of whom will get angry if criticized. Further, being unwilling to accept (7) is not sufficient for acceptance of (9): I may just be ignorant about whether any boys will get angry if criticized.
So (7) is of limited value as an analysis of (3). But I think there is something we can learn from it. (7) is perfectly intelligible; it preserves the idea that conditional thoughts involve suppositions; and it reminds us that the presence of a quantified noun phrase on which the reference of subsequent pronouns depends, does not force us to discern a propositional function with a couple of variables bound by the quantifier.
Since Gareth Evans's (1977) work on pronouns, it is widely recognised that not all anaphoric pronouns whose reference is determined by a preceding quantified noun phrase can be treated as bound variables. For one thing, the pronouns may be in different sentences, which may be used to perform different speech acts, possibly by different speakers:
(A) An insurance salesman is coming to see me today. What shall I say to him? (B) Don't let him into the house! Secondly, the bound-variable treatment often gets the truth conditions wrong: "Just one man drank the rum, and he got ill" does not mean "There is just one man x such that x drank the rum and x got ill".
2 If we cannot find a reductive analysis of (9), we are free to construe it fairly literally, as saying something along the following lines:
There is a boy in the class who is like this: suppose I criticize him; then he will get angry or perhaps more succinctly:
There is a boy in the class such that, on the supposition that I criticize him, he will get angry. Among the sufficient conditions for accepting something of this form, i.e. "There is an F which is G if it is H", are (a) the belief some individual a is G on the supposition that it is H, where a is taken to be an F; (b) given the judgement that the Fs are independent with respect to whether they are G if H, the belief that some F is G on the supposition that all Fs are H; (c) the belief that some F is disposed to have a high chance of being G given that it is H; (d) the belief that some F is either ¬H or G, with no firm belief about whether such an F is ¬H, or whether it is G; (e) the belief that some F is G, and being H is irrelevant to whether it is G. This list may have redundancies; it may be incomplete. Perhaps someone can do a neater job. But there is nothing objectionable, or unusual, about there being a variety of grounds for a claim of a given kind.
Turning from defensive to offensive mode, truth-conditional semantics fare badly with examples of the form of (9) (as they do with compounds of conditionals in general). Treating the conditional truth-functionally, a sufficient condition for the truth of (9) is that there is at least one boy whom I don't criticize. The following argument is valid, construing the conditional truth-functionally: "There are at least two boys in the class; therefore, there is a boy in the class who will be overjoyed if I criticize him and him alone tomorrow". For there must be at least one boy such that I don't criticize him and him alone tomorrow, hence a boy such that either I don't criticize him and him alone, or he will be overjoyed.
Although the truth-functional account gets some things wrong, it also gets some things right which stronger truth conditions do not 3 (the truthfunctional account would hardly have survived, with many defenders, were this not so): believing that A ∨ B, while having no firm belief about A or about B, and having no relevant beliefs about the satisfaction of stronger conditions, is enough for belief that if ¬A, B. This case can generate belief in an existentially quantified conditional: Tom is a boy in the class. Tom is either ill or pretending to be ill (I have no firm belief about which). So Tom is ill if he isn't pretending to be ill. So (**) a boy in the class is ill if he isn't pretending to be ill. No stronger condition need be recognized to obtain to justify the belief (**). Hence, statements of the form "There is an F which is G if it is H " are not existential generalizations of conditionals with stronger-thantruth-functional truth conditions. This repeats the pattern we find with other compounds. The truth-functional account gets many things wrong. Other things, no stronger truth condition gets right. Intuitively it is safe to say, of an unseen geometric shape, "It's not the case that if it's a pentagon it has six sides". But on the truth-functional account, you will be wrong if the shape is not a pentagon. Gibbard (1981, pp. 234-5) proved that no stronger-than-truth-functional truth conditions have the equivalence between "If (A & B), C " and "If A, then if B, C ". Intuitively, "If it rains or snows, then if it doesn't rain it will snow" is as acceptable as "If it rains or snows, and it doesn't rain, it will snow". But for "closest possible world" truth conditions, for example, the first may be false, and "If it rains or snows, then if it doesn't rain, it won't snow" may be true; also "If it doesn't rain, then if it rains or snows, it will rain" may be true.
Compounds of conditionals are hard: much harder than one would expect if conditionals have truth conditions. David Lewis wrote "We think we know how the truth conditions of sentences of various kinds are determined by the truth conditions of constituent subsentences, but this knowledge would be useless if any of those subsentences lacked truth conditions" (1976, p. 142) . Now this knowledge is useless (or at least far from sufficient) when we try to figure out how conditionals function as subsentences. If conditionals had truth conditions, it would not be. So reflections about compounds support the conclusion that conditionals don't have truth conditions. Finally, I don't find Kölbel's label "expressivist" a helpful characterization of my view of conditionals. If they have truth conditions, someone who utters a conditional expresses a belief, and asserts the content of that belief. For me, someone who utters a conditional expresses a conditional beliefa belief in the consequent under the supposition of the antecedent, and is conditionally committed to the content of that belief. The thesis is that conditional beliefs and assertions do not reduce to unconditional beliefs and assertions (similarly for conditional desires and other propositional attitudes, and for conditional commands, questions, promises, offers and other speech acts). I don't see anything more "expressivist" in my account than in a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.
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